Mongolia has quietly become one of the world’s pivotal suppliers of fluorspar, the mineral feedstock for hydrofluoric acid used across batteries, semiconductors, aluminium and steel. Yet almost all of Mongolia’s tonnage still travels east to China and north to Russia. For an EU that has declared fluorspar “critical” and is scrambling to de-risk materials supply chains, this is a blind spot hiding in plain sight.
A critical mineral hiding in everyday tech
Fluorspar, sold as acid-grade (>97% CaF₂) and metallurgical-grade, is the starting point for hydrofluoric acid, the precursor to most fluorine-containing chemicals. Those chemicals underpin everything from chip etching and refrigerants to aluminium smelting (via aluminium fluoride) and the electrolytes that make lithium-ion batteries work.
In Europe, acid-grade fluorspar feeds domestic HF plants and aluminium fluoride producers; EU demand is measured in the hundreds of thousands of tonnes per year.
Mongolia’s surge – and where it goes
Global fluorspar output hovered around 9.5 million tonnes in 2024; the US Geological Survey noted that 2023’s increase was driven primarily by Mongolia ramping up production. But the trade routes are lopsided: in 2021, fully 88% of Mongolian fluorspar exports went to China (58%) and Russia (30%), with only small volumes reaching other markets.
In 2024, fluorspar (≤97% CaF₂, HS 252921) ranked among Mongolia’s top merchandise exports by value, at roughly USD 287 million – evidence of a growing, commercialised supply base.
Europe remains a price-taker
Despite Spain’s Minersa operating Europe’s largest fluorspar mine, the EU as a whole is structurally short: there are no EU member states that are net exporters of fluorspar, and the bloc is the world’s largest importer, drawing much of its supply from Mexico, South Africa, China and Vietnam.
That leaves European HF and aluminium-fluoride producers exposed to external price swings and export policies – some of which have tightened in recent years.
Brussels has a plan – just not yet for fluorspar
The Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) sets targets to mine 10%, process 40% and recycle 25% of the EU’s needs domestically by 2030. Recent batches of CRMA “strategic projects” have prioritised battery metals and rare-earths across and beyond the EU.
Sensible – but they don’t resolve Europe’s near-term dependency on imported acidspar and metspar. Fluorspar is on the EU’s 2023 critical list; giving it project-level attention is the logical next step.
Why Mongolia matters to Europe
Mongolia’s supply is real, large, and getting more investable:
- Industrial base and grades.
The state company, now branded Erdenes Critical Minerals (formerly “Mongolrostsvetmet”), mines at Bor-Undur and Khukh Del and produces both acid-grade (FF-97/FF-95) and metallurgical-grade (FK-75) concentrates at the country’s largest processing plant. That breadth matters for EU buyers who need acidspar for HF and metspar for steel. - Policy signals.
Ulaanbaatar has reworked its mineral-royalty methodology to track prices quoted on domestic exchanges, aiming to reduce distortions from old reference pricing. Tying royalties to transparent market prints is a small but meaningful step toward the commercial norms European buyers expect. - Scale and momentum. Mongolia’s minerals sector delivered the bulk of the country’s export earnings in 2024-25, indicating administrative focus and logistics that EU counterparties can build on with long-term offtakes rather than opportunistic spot buys.
The strategic risk of doing nothing
Europe’s HF chain, and by extension its semiconductor chemicals, refrigerants, EV electrolyte salts and aluminium smelting, cannot function without reliable acidspar.
With Chinese and Russian import channels absorbing most Mongolian tons, Europe is left competing in a thinner pool fed by Mexico, South Africa and Asia.
In any future trade friction or export curbs, price spikes and allocation risk would again cascade through EU industry, just as they did with other materials in recent years.
The bottom line
Fluorspar sits at the base of value chains Europe says it cannot afford to lose. The EU already imports the majority of what it uses, and Mongolia is one of the few places ramping up supply, just not for Europe.
With the CRMA machinery now in motion, there is a narrow window to diversify and de-risk. If Brussels is serious about strategic autonomy, fluorspar needs to move from a line on a critical list to a funded, contracted, westbound reality.
Sources:
European Commission, “Critical raw materials” (2023 list: includes fluorspar).
USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries: Fluorspar (2024/2025).
WTO Tariff & Trade Data (Mongolia export composition; HS 252921 value, 2024).
European Environment Agency/ETC report on fluoropolymers (acid-grade fluorspar → HF).
Reuters, EU CRMA strategic projects and 2030 targets.
MONTSAME, “Mining Sector Requests Extension on New Royalty Calculation Method” (Aug 29, 2025).
Erdenes Critical Minerals (ex-Mongolrostsvetmet): mines, grades, Bor-Undur processing.
LIFE Programme project note: EU demand (~755 kt/yr) and importer status.
